# Vladimir Putin TBR's Man of the Year

### An Analysis of Putin's Role in the Resurrection of Russia & the Demise of the New World Order

### By Matthew Raphael Johnson, Ph.D.

n the 1990s, Russia experienced a total shock and awe destruction of her economy and public degradation of huge social costs and losses. The total weakening of the state against this background was

weakening of the state against this simply inevitable. Russia had ceased to exist between 1992 and 2000, as law enforcement devolved to regional bosses and organized crime. No one today denies any of this. It was critical, and even the costs of World War II, affecting maybe 50% of the economy, paled in comparison to the 80% loss of GDP suffered in this period. Russia survived the Vikings, Mongols, Turks, Napoleon, Lenin, Hitler and Stalin, but collapsed when Western liberalism was imposed on the country in 1990.

Now the Westernized political establishment refuses to remember how difficult this period was. Few of Putin's critics remember that the most authori-

tative experts and many international leaders in the late 1990s came to agreement in one prediction for the future of Russia: bankruptcy, decay and eventual disappearance. This writer challenges anyone to find a parallel in history for this national destruction without warfare or violence. The problem was that this was neither accidental nor decried in the West. It was called "progress," even as the shocking statistics became well known.

From January 2000, Putin's first month in office, to today's date, the dollar exchange rate has changed to one ruble to one dollar. In 1995, it was from 28 to 29 rubles to the dollar, and at the time of the default in 1997, hyperinflation brought it to 500,000 or more rubles to the dollar. Few believed the ruble would survive.


Putin took over with a clique of former security service

members who were overwhelmingly nationalist. Few knew much about Marx and no members were internationalists. The fact is that very early on in the USSR, the army and security services were nationalist, never Marxist. Most considered Bolshevism a form of nationalism, having nothing to do with Marx at all. Americans were far more sympathetic to Marx than Soviet elites from Stalin onward.

Putin's agenda was as simple as it was inevitable: rebuild the state, unify the country, stop population loss and, finally, put those responsible for the destruction of Russia in prison. No means were too harsh, since this was an emergency of catastrophic proportions. Few police-

men would listen, so Putin was forced to use federal troops for simple tax collection. The army and security services were reformed as the IMF was kicked out of the country. Russia became China's supplier of raw materials, computer and military equipment, as well as oil and natural gas.

Putin stopped the war in Chechnya and supported the idea of an Islamic, pro-Russian president. Since the Islamic radicals had removed by force and intimidation thousands





Boris Yeltsin, tool of the kleptocrats.

## Historic Deal Made by Putin to Save Russia from Disintegration

utin made a historic deal to save Russia from disintegration." This was stated by former Soviet President Mikhail

Gorbachev, RIA Novosti information agency reported. "I think we all—all Russian citizens—must remember that he saved us from the collapse that began in Russia. A lot of regions did not recognize, in fact, our constitution," said Gorbachev during the presentation of his new book *After the Kremlin*. Gorbachev, a long-time opponent of Putin, said that this was the main merit of Putin to the Russian people.

State Duma deputy and People's Artist of the USSR Joseph Kobzon, together with several other members of parliament and public figures, urged the committee to nominate Russian President Vladimir Putin for the Nobel Peace Prize. This is reported by Russian media with reference to Kobzon's speech at a press conference on October 1.

Initially, this idea came to the leadership of the International Academy of Spiritual Unity and Cooperation Among the Peoples of the World.

"We know very well what kind of peacekeeping role was played in difficult areas, especially in Beslan and South Ossetia. Our president has earned it," said the president of the academy, George Trapeznikov.

In turn, the president's press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said that the International Academy has not yet discussed its decision with the administration of the Kremlin. In addition, Peskov said that Putin is not a supporter of receiving awards and prizes. He also mentioned that others have been talking about the award for the role of Vladimir Putin in the settlement of the Syrian crisis as premature, since it is necessary to wait to see if this settlement will, in fact, last.

of professors and bureaucrats who were pro-Russian, coercive means were justified in retaliation.

The West fumed as Putin stopped the flow of American guns and drugs into Russia from Afghanistan. Worse, Putin chuckled as the green American military elites were reluctantly outplayed in Iraq and Afghanistan while the Russian-Iranian-Chinese triangle made Putin untouchable. Since then, nothing has changed.

Western journalists and professors called Putin every name they could as his popularity soared. These people were not used to being told "no," so the heart attacks were music to the real populists' ears.

Most Russians would have killed for the USSR to return, as would every one reading this, had they been through the same. It is the height of ignorance and prejudice to claim that Soviet elites were "Marxist." Few real Marxists existed outside of the American and English university system. Most in the USSR saw Leninism, Stalinism and Communism as distinct from Marxism and even opposed to it.

At the time, the average Russian salary was \$100 yearly, with many state salaries paid in vodka or other goods. There was a complete lack of consumer loans, credit cards, a network of markets or any kind of consumer infrastructure. A handful of elites controlled the 20% of Russia that remained, and were in the process of liquidating that even as Putin was throwing them in prison. The country cheered and Putin became the most popular man in the world. Well, except among the American rich. This was in 2002.

Modern Russia is a normal European country, with a rising standard of living, now the sixth largest economy in the

world, just above Canada and almost the same as Britain. Putin came into office on New Years 1999-2000 with an agenda. It was the radical proposition that Russian interests should be considered equal to American. "Heresy" was shouted from Harvard, where hippy peaceniks suddenly were demanding a mass invasion of Russia and China, preferably at the same time. Cooler heads prevailed. Of course, they believe that only weak states that no one knows really anything about should be invaded, because: a) they won't put up a fight; b) have no nuclear weapons; and c) their obscurity means that the media can say anything about them and it will be believed.

So, why are Putin's popularity ratings still at 85-90%, even after 15 years?

First, 1992. The Yeltsin regime, bossed around by the United States, abolished the export duty on petroleum products. In August 1999, Yeltsin appointed Putin prime minister and Putin's government in September increased the duty to 7.5 euros per ton, and from Dec. 8, to 15 euros per ton. Later on, the duty only increased, but still, against all the "free market" hacks, oil is now exporting at about 50% of its 1995 price.

Two, Russia in terms of retail auto sales is ahead of Spain, ranking fifth in Europe after Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and France. All this is a consequence of the increase in demand, and therefore income growth. This is a completely objective factor and it is a consequence of the

economic policy pursued by Putin and nothing else. In Asia, Russian autos are in high demand.


Third, for 10 years as a whole, the budget for social programs (desperately needed) increased by 30% yearly. Pensions were below the poverty line by 25% under Yeltsin. Now, they are more than 50% above this line and are increasing.

Fourth, Putin nationalized Yukos Oil even as Michael Khodorkovsky tried to sell it to Exxon-Mobil. When Khodorkovsky was jailed, Russia cheered. Only hanging him would have made Putin more popular. After that, tax collection increased massively from all businesses fearful of ending up like Khodorkovsky. It was nothing short of a miracle that has never occurred before. Sending a few people to prison made Putin so popular that the name "Vladimir" tripled in popularity among newborn boys. Putin massively increased tax revenue so that even arrears were covered. Putin proved the "free market" wrong again and, thus, revived the state. This all had a snowball effect that no one predicted—except Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Unfortunately, no one in the United States was listening.

Fifth, in 2004, in a little-discussed move, Putin finally abolished the law called the "Production Sharing Agreement." Under this law, Russian deposits of natural resources were under "international" jurisdiction. That meant that British Petroleum and Exxon controlled Russian natural resources *de facto*. The death threats poured

## Russian Populist: The Political Thought of Vladimir Putin

By Dr. Matthew Raphael Johnson, former editor of THE BARNES REVIEW Revisionist history journal. This book explains why nationalists across the globe are calling Russian President Vladimir Putin "The Russian Populist." Dr. Johnson, an acknowledged expert on Russian and Slavic studies, tells us exactly what makes Vladimir Putin tick in his new book, Russian Populist: The Political Thought of Vladimir Putin. From Putin's rise to political power, through his crushing of the "Oligarchs," and up to today's frequent clashes with Western meddlers, Johnson lays out the policies that Putin has put in place to restore Russia to the glory days of old. While the mainstream media portrays Putin as a



hard-line Bolshevik in sheep's clothing, Johnson shows how Putin's many agrarian, industrial, social and financial reforms—almost invariably implemented for the benefit of the future of Russia—reveal Putin's true motives. He has, in fact, garnered such hostility from the U.S. simply because he has managed to do what the United States has not: create powerful economic alliances outside the control of the NWO. Softcover, 175 pages, #630, \$25 plus \$5 S&H in the U.S. TBR subscribers get 10% off. Bulk prices (five or more) are available. Email sales@barnesreview.org for foreign S&H. Order from TBR BOOK CLUB, P.O. Box 15877, Washington, D.C. 20003 or call toll free 1-877-773-9077 to charge.

in. Apparently, this only increased Putin's popularity. Suddenly, a whole bunch of people no one in the world ever heard of before were being paraded in front of Western TV screens as "dissidents." Now, we know why. Russian oil was not benefiting Russians at all, but had been going to the accounts of foreign banks and oil companies. The money from oil production was primarily going to the British-Dutch company Shell. Putin was condemned as being "against the free market" on these grounds. Putin stated simply that Russian resources belong to Russia. Now, that commonsense statement was Putin's death sentence. Unfortunately, carrying it out has been difficult.

After the liquidation of this ill-advised agreement, the Russian national budget increased by 300-400% almost instantly. Putin was ostracized by the entire Anglo-Saxon world, but Germany and France saw a winner and bet on Putin and Russia. Putin was tagged by Russians as the leader of the "National Revolution" as his simple agenda went against the system created by the Americans.

Sixth, he eliminated the influence of the West on most political processes. In 1992-1995, the Russian state appa-

ratus was created by foreign advisers. All legislation in Russia from the 1990s, including tax laws, was written from foreign grants. In total, 10,000 foreign advisers were working in Russian ministries and departments, including all economic centers, both public and private.

The "sponsorship assistance" of the Soros Fund created school history textbooks, in which the battle of Stalingrad received two pages, yet U.S. presidents were mentioned far more

than Peter the Great or Nicholas II. Russian students were given notebooks with portraits of four American presidents on the last page. It's true. I've seen them.

Seventh, Putin ended the war in the Caucasus, with the separatists destroyed and all, more or less, of the well-known militant leaders eliminated. Separatism died out naturally, but only when the Chechen elite felt the power of Moscow and the benefits of cooperation with a huge and growing market. Attempts by Western intelligence agencies to feed anti-Russian hatred led to more specific attacks on targets, but this is the maximum that can be expected. The war was and is no more.

Eighth, Putin's economic policy has been designed against debt bondage. Under Putin, Russia significantly increased the volume of the economy focused on the elimination of poverty, raised real incomes, and created reserves that now allow the country to pass through crises with minimal losses of the standard of living. Moreover, in the midst of the 2007 crisis, Russia was able to significantly increase pensions and other social benefits.

The Russian constitution is written in such a way that the president does not fundamentally affect everything that happens in the state. Omnipotent power is nowhere to be found and, now, impossible. This logic is used against Putin to criticize him, but does not exist where the economy is concerned. The work was done by Russians; Putin only made the fruits of labor more secure. He proved that Russians were nationalists at heart, and would support any policy that put their interests first. It was not that hard to do.

So what do we have?

Foreign exchange reserves at the end of February 2011 were at \$487 billion in gold—third in the world. This is 4,000% higher than in 1999, when Russian gold reserves were at \$12 billion. Russia today has approximately the same gold reserves as the European Union.

Public external debt in 1999 stood at \$138 billion, or 78% of GDP. By January 2010, it decreased by 3,400% and now is \$40.7 billion, or 2.75% of GDP. Inflation in 1999 hit 36.5%, while inflation in 2010 was 8.8%.

The Foreign Direct Investment total in 2010 was at \$114.7 billion. In comparison, FDI in China's economy in

2010 amounted to \$105.7 billion—or \$79 per capita compared to \$98 for every Russian soul.

Average life expectancy for women has increased by 2.5 years up to almost 75 years, and has already exceeded the highest figure in Russian history, which was 74.3 years in 1990. The death rate from accidental alcohol poisoning in 2003 was recorded at 45,045 cases, but dropped in 2010 to 14,381 cases. The birth rate in 2010 was 12.6 children per 1,000 inhabi-

tants—41% more than in 2000.

We just wonder why any man who can—even in part—boast of a record like this would have to rig an election. ◆

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